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Abstract—As computers approach the physical limits of in-
formation storable in memory, new methods will be needed to
further improve information storage and retrieval. We propose
a quantum inspired vector based approach, which offers a
contextually dependent mapping from the subsymbolic to the
symbolic representations of information. If implemented com-
putationally, this approach would provide exceptionally high
density of information storage, without the traditionally required
physical increase in storage capacity. The approach is inspired
by the structure of human memory and incorporates elements
of Ga¨rdenfors’ Conceptual Space approach and Humphreys et
al.’s matrix model of memory.
I. MEMORY STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION DENSITY
The age of density driven computer memory increase is
fast approaching its conclusion. With Moore’s law suggesting
that we are nearing the physical limits of information density
storable in standard computational memory, it is time to inves-
tigate new paradigms of information storage and retrieval. This
paper proposes that a recently developed class of cognitive
models provide a highly promising avenue, that can be used
to shift the current information storage paradigm from a
density dependent model to a more structural methodology.
Our approach is inspired by insights from neuroscientific
studies of memory, and focuses upon the context in which
information is encoded and subsequently recalled. Mathemat-
ically, it is grounded in a vector-based formalism that utilizes
the probability structure of quantum theory which draws upon
two related lines of research. One derives from modern ap-
proaches to information retrieval which attempt to incorporate
a sophisticated notion of context into the classification of
information as relevant to a query ([1], [2], [3], [4]). The
second approach is more squarely based in cognitive science,
and uses a quantum approach to model concepts and their
combinations ([5], [6], [7], [8]).
In summary, the key purpose of this paper is to suggest a
new paradigm for information storage and retrieval in context
that allows for a marked increase in the amount of information
storable by a given resource. This will require the identification
of a mechanism by which stored information can be retrieved,
which somehow links that information to relevant storage and
retrieval contexts. We provide tentative solutions for both of
these problems.
We begin with a brief summary of how a subsymbolic
encoding in human memory can still give rise to a symbolic
capacity. This is followed by a review of the Conceptual
Space approach advocated by Ga¨rdenfors [9], which proposes
a framework of three tiers for understanding human memory.
We then discuss the Matrix Model of Memory [10], which
shows how a memory can be encoded along with information
about the context in which it occurred. This will lead us to
consider the treatment of context in that model and finally to
extend it through reference to a quantum information retrieval
framework which combines the desirable features of each
approach. We propose that our approach not only allows for an
exceptionally high density memory storage but also provides
a memory architecture that can process information in a way
that is flexible, adaptive, and possibly even creative.
II. SYMBOLIC AND SUBSYMBOLIC LEVELS OF HUMAN
MEMORY
Let us begin by examining the architecture of human
memory (summarized in [11]). This will serve as a starting
point to build a computer memory that uses similar basic
mechanisms to human memory.
A. The Subsymbolic Level
We take as a starting point some fairly well established
characteristics of memory. Human memories are encoded
in neurons that are sensitive to ranges (or values) of what
has been called subsymbolic microfeatures [12], [13]. For
example, one might respond to lines of a particular orientation,
or the quality of honesty, or quite possibly something that
does not exactly match an established term [14]. Note that
sometimes use the word concept is used by non-neuroscientists
(e.g. [15]) to refer to subsymbolic microfeatures. In this paper,
the word microfeatures is used to refer to stimuli responded
to by single cells, which may or may not be meaningful in
daily life, and the word concepts to refer to things like DOG or
BEAUTY that are generally comprised of many microfeatures,
and refer collectively to a class of instances or exemplars that
are meaningful in daily life.
Another characteristic of memory is that although each
neuron responds maximally to a particular microfeature, it
responds to a lesser extent to related microfeatures, an or-
ganizational structure referred to as coarse coding [16]. For
example, neuron A may respond preferentially to sounds of a
certain frequency, while its neighbor B responds preferentially
to sounds of a slightly different frequency, and so forth.
However, although A responds maximally to sounds of one
frequency, it responds to a lesser degree to sounds of a similar
frequency. The upshot is that an item in memory is stored in a
distributed manner across a cell assembly that contains many
neurons, and likewise, each neuron participates in the storage
of many items [17]. A given experience activates not just one
neuron, nor every neuron to an equal degree, but activation is
spread across members of an assembly. This means that the
same neurons get used and re-used in different capacities, a
phenomenon referred to as neural re-entrance [18].
The final key attribute of memory is its content addressabil-
ity, meaning that there is a systematic relationship between
the content of a representation, and the neurons where it gets
encoded. This emerges naturally as a consequence of the fact
that representations activate neurons that are tuned to respond
to particular features, so representations that get encoded in
overlapping regions of memory share features. As a result,
they can thereafter be evoked by stimuli that are similar or
resonant in some (perhaps context-specific) way [17], [19].
Note that even if a brain does not possess a neuron that
is maximally tuned to a particular microfeature, the brain
is still able to encode stimuli in which that microfeature
predominates, because representations are distributed across
many neurons.
Note that on the basis of the discovery of single cells
in the human brain that have highly selective, abstract and
invariant responses to complex, natural stimuli, which have
unfortunately been called concept cells, some neuroscientists
have questioned the idea that representations are distributed
[15]. This is not inconsistent with the variety of distributed
representation discussed here. If you artificially activate one
neuron, it gives an invariant response. It is because real-world
stimuli and experiences activate not just one neuron but many
that actual representations in memory are distributed.
B. The Symbolic Level
Consciously experienced symbolic meanings emerge in re-
sponse to the set of subsymbolic microfeatures responded to by
the entire constellation of activated neurons. Sometimes these
neurons have been activated as a unit many times before, at
others the constellation consists of neurons that have never
been activated simultaneously as a whole. In this case an
emergent meaning may simultaneously incorporate elements
of different symbolic representations.
The distributed, content addressable architecture of memory
is critical to the adaptive, flexible, and creative manner in
which the information it stores is not just retrieved when
required, but frequently reconstructed in contextually appropri-
ate and sometimes even creative ways. If this memory were not
distributed then there would be no overlap between items that
share microfeatures, and thus no means of forging associations
between them. If it were not content-addressable then these
associations would not be meaningful. The upshot is that rep-
resentations which share features are encoded in overlapping
distributions of neurons, and therefore activation can spread
from one to another. Thus representations are encoded in
memory in a way that takes into account how they are related,
even if this relationship has never been consciously noticed
[20], [11], [21]. This is not earth shattering; indeed it seems
fairly obvious with respect to the hierarchical structure of
knowledge. We may never have explicitly learned that a white
hamster is a mammal, but we know it is one nonetheless. In
this sense it is reasonable to claim that people implicitly know
more than they have ever explicitly learnt. This architecture
has implications that extend far beyond issues related to the
hierarchical structure of knowledge.
It should be pointed out how different this is from the typical
structure of computer memory. In a computer memory, each
possible input is stored in a unique address. Retrieval is thus
a matter of looking up the address in a register and then
fetching the corresponding item at the specified location. Since
there is no overlap of representations, there is no means of
creatively forging new associations based on newly perceived
similarities. The exceptions are computer architectures that are
designed to mimic, or are inspired by, the distributed, content-
addressable nature of human memory, but these are difficult to
discuss formally. In this paper we shall propose a theoretical
structure that can be used to map subsymbolic architectures
to symbolic representations, and so potentially provide a more
flexible, adaptable and creative approach to computer memory.
C. Forging Unusual Associations through Reconstructive In-
terference of Memories
A fascinating finding to come out of the early connectionist
literature is that in a distributed, content addressable memory,
not only do representations that share features activate each
other, they sometimes interact in a way that is creative. Even
a simple neural network is able to abstract a prototype, fill in
missing features of a noisy or incomplete pattern, or create
a new pattern on the fly that is more appropriate to the
situation than anything it has ever been fed as input [22].
In fact, similar representations can interfere with one another
[23], [24], [25], and these same papers provide numerous
names for this phenomenon: crosstalk; false memories; spu-
rious memories; ghosts; and superposition catastrophe. These
phenomena are suggestive of a form of thought that, if not
outright creative, involves a departure from known reality.
Findings from neuroscience are also highly consistent with
this phenomenon; as Edelman puts it, one does not retrieve
a stored item from memory so much as reconstruct it [26].
That is, an item in memory is never re-experienced in exactly
the form it was first experienced, but colored, however subtly,
by what has been experienced in the meantime, re-assembled
spontaneously in a way that relates to the task at hand (one
reason eye-witness accounts cannot always be trusted [27],
[28], [29]).
Because information is encoded in a distributed manner
across ensembles of neurons interacting by way of synapses,
the meaning of a representation is in part derived from the
meanings of other representations that excite similar constel-
lations of neurons; that is why memory is sometimes referred
to as associative. Content addressability ensures that the brain
naturally brings to mind items that are similar in some perhaps
unexpected or indefinable but useful or appealing way to what
is currently being experienced. Recall that if the regions in
memory where two distributed representations are encoded
overlap then they share one or more microfeatures. They may
have been encoded at different times, under different circum-
stances, and the correlation between them never explicitly
noticed. But the fact that their distributions overlap means that
some context could come along for which this overlap would
be relevant, causing one to evoke the other. There are as many
routes by which an association between two representations
can be forged as there are microfeatures by which they overlap;
i.e., there is room for typical as well as atypical connections.
Therefore what gets evoked in a given situation is relevant,
and that happens for free; no search is necessary at all because
memory is content-addressable. The like attracts like principle
is embedded in our neural architecture.
Moreover, because memory is distributed and subject to
crosstalk, if a situation does come along that is relevant to
multiple representations, they merge together, a phenomenon
that has been termed reconstructive interference [30]. The
multiple items may be so similar to each other that you never
detect that the recollection is actually a blend of many items,
and in this case the distributions of neurons activated overlap
substantially. Alternatively, they may differ in mundane ways,
as in everyday mind-wandering. They may be superficially
different but related in a way you never noticed before, in
which case the distributions of neurons activated overlaps
only with respect to only a few features that happen to be
relevant or important in the present context. Finally, the present
experience may infuse recall of a previous experience that is
relevant or important with respect to only a few key features.
We now turn to some of the models that have been proposed
to describe this merging of the subsymbolic and the symbolic
levels of human memory. We shall find a number which share
a key set of features.
III. MEMORY MODELS INSPIRED BY THE MULTI-LEVELED
ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN MEMORY
Ga¨rdenfors [9] has proposed a three level model of cognition
in which the representation of information varies greatly
at each level. Within the lowest level, information is pre-
conceptual or subsymbolic, and is carried by a connectionist
representation.
At the uppermost level information is represented in terms
of higher order symbolic structures such as sentences. Gram-
mars specify the parts of a sentence, and the manner in which
they fit together. It is at this upper symbolic level of cognition
where a significant portion of the computational literature
resides. Indeed, the very storage of information in a standard
computer architecture could be understood as belonging to this
level.
While the need for at least these two levels seems intuitively
plausible, the gap between the upper, logical level and the
lowest connectionist level is difficult to bridge. How are we to
connect the symbolic approaches with the structural? There is
a possibility for some approach that shares logical and struc-
tural characteristics between the symbolic and the structural
levels of cognition, and this is precisely where Ga¨rdenfors’
intermediate, conceptual level, or conceptual space, is intro-
duced. Rather than relying upon a connectionist structure, an
intermediate geometric representation is used which provides
an expressive theoretical framework capable of linking the
‘hardware’ of a ‘neuronal’ level with the more commonly
described, and theoretically understood, logical level.
IV. ENCODING INFORMATION IN A CONCEPTUAL
STRUCTURE
Within a conceptual space, knowledge has a dimensional
structure. For example, the property COLOR can be repre-
sented in terms of three dimensions: hue, chromaticity, and
brightness, which can be mapped into a convex region in a
geometric space. Thus, the property RED is a convex region
within the tri-dimensional space made up of hue, chromaticity
and brightness, and the property BLUE would occupy a
different region of this same space. A domain is a set of
integral dimensions in the sense that values in particular
dimensions can determine (or affect) the values possible in
others. For example, the three dimensions defining the color
space are integral since the brightness of a color will affect
both its saturation (chromaticity) and hue. Ga¨rdenfors extends
the notion of properties into concepts, which are likewise
based on domains.
For example, the concept APPLE may have domains taste,
shape, color, etc. Context is modeled as a weighting function
on the domains, for example, when eating an apple, the taste
domain will be prominent, but when playing with it, the shape
domain (i.e. its roundness) will be heavily weighted.
Observe the distinction between representations at the sym-
bolic and conceptual levels. At the symbolic level, the con-
cept APPLE can be represented as the atomic proposition
apple(x). However, within a conceptual space (conceptual
level), it has a representation involving multiple inter-related
dimensions and domains. Colloquially speaking, the token
“apple” (which might be spoken, written etc.) is the tip of an
iceberg with a rich underlying representation at the conceptual
level. Ga¨rdenfors points out that the symbolic and conceptual
representations of information are not in conflict with each
other, but are to be seen as “different perspectives on how
information is described”.
However, an implementation problem arises in that both
the representation and the generation of a conceptual space
from its underlying content has generally been discussed only
for simple examples such as those above. It is not clear
how more complex examples could be implemented. A more
comprehensive and systematic approach to the representation
of conceptual spaces is required.
Vector space based models (VSBM) provide a viable first
avenue here. These can be traced back to the seminal paper
of Salton et al. [31] who were searching for an appropriate
mathematical space to represent documents for the purposes
of Information Retrieval. Starting from a few basic desiderata,
they settled upon a vector in a high dimensional vector space
as an appropriate representation of a document. Within this
framework, a query is treated like a small (pseudo) document
that is also converted to vector form. The documents in the
corpus are then ranked according to their distance to the
query; closer documents are considered more relevant than
ones that are further away. One of the main drawbacks of this
system was that it had trouble returning documents that would
have been highly relevant if one of the words in the query
was replaced by a synonym. The next advance came from
representing concepts latently in a so-called semantic space
where they are not formally represented or labeled. Semantic
spaces are instances of vector spaces, and represent words
in a basis created from other words, concepts, documents,
or topics. They are generally built from the observation of
co-occurrences in large text corpora. In word spaces such as
the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) [32], the basis
consists of every word in the vocabulary. Thus, the vector
for a given word w is calculated by summing the number of
occurrences of word w(i) in a given context window around
each occurrence of w and writing that number at the position
i in the vector that represents w. This number can be adjusted
using the distance (defined in terms of the number of words)
or mutual information measures such as Point-Wise Mutual
Information, which allows for a weighting of the importance
of the word at that position. It is also possible to take word
order into account [33], [34]. Later models derived a more
fundamental semantic value through a reduction of the initial
word space using mathematical tools such as Singular Value
Decomposition [35], Non Negative Matrix factorization [36],
or random projection [37], all of which generate a new smaller
basis which can under certain conditions be naturally related
to certain topics, objects and concepts [36].
Semantic space models, however, do not make provision for
integral dimensions (a notion related to that of ‘core proper-
ties’ of a concept). This leaves them too situation dependent,
and relevant primarily for the text collection from which
they were constructed. For the purposes of next generation
information storage, we will require a more objective informa-
tion storage mechanism that can function satisfactorily at the
conceptual level. Thus, while learning from the semantic space
approaches, this paper will propose that we extend them from a
text based, and corpus dependent information representation,
to a concept and property inspired approach. However, the
vector based analytical contributions of the semantic space
approaches will play a key inspirational role as we start with
this extension.
V. INFORMATION RETRIEVAL IN A MATRIX MODEL OF
MEMORY
We now turn to a promising treatment of retrieval, that
is capable of providing a map between the neural and con-
ceptual levels of information storage. The matrix model of
memory [10] is a well known cognitive model. It stores and
encodes memories as patterns of interconnections between
the elements that define items in memory (i.e. the neurons
for a subsymbolic structure). All memories are superimposed
(summated) in this representation so that, without appropriate
cuing, their individual identities are lost. Thus, the model
provides a natural link between the lower and mid levels of
information that Ga¨rdenfors proposes. For example, when a
set of interconnected neurons fires, this can be represented in
the matrix model as a set of entries in a matrix, with the entries
in the matrix corresponding to the probability that a particular
pairing of nodes will concurrently fire (although this is not a
necessary interpretation of the model [10]).
Humphreys et al. [10] take the position that there are
two fundamental but pervasive memory access operations;
matching and retrieval. Matching involves the comparison of
test cue(s) with the information stored in memory, and gives
the strength of the match as output. In contrast, retrieval
involves the recovery of an associate of a cue (i.e. the return
of actual information), and so is the concept in which we are
currently interested.
The matrix model takes an item Ai, occurring in a context
X , to retrieve a list associate Bi. This assumes that a three-way
association (between the context, the cue and the desired item)
must have been stored. This is represented mathematically
as the three-dimensional array xa′ib
′′
i , where x is a column
vector, a
′
i is a row vector, xa
′
i is a n × n matrix, and b
′′
i is
another vector in an orthogonal dimension to x and a′i. (Primes
are used to indicate this set of orthogonality relationships.)
The matrix xa′i represents the association between the context
x and the cue a′i. If a list of items A1B1, A2B2 . . . AkBk
is learned in a context X , then Humphreys et al. define
the memory for the list as a simple sum over all the three-
dimensional arrays that were formed:
E =
k∑
i=1
xa
′
ib
′′
i . (1)
This list memory E is added onto any pre-existing memories
in a process that we leave to the original article [10].
Retrieval from this list memory is defined by Humphreys et
al. [10] to work as follows. First, a test cue xa′j is applied to
the list memory:
(xa
′
j) ·E = (xa
′
j) ·
(
k∑
i=1
xa
′
ib
′′
i
)
(2)
=
k∑
i=1
[(xa
′
j) · (xa
′
i)]b
′′
i (3)
=
k∑
i=1
[(x · x)(a
′
j · a
′
i)]b
′′
i (4)
= [(x · x)(a
′
j · a
′
j)]b
′′
j +
∑
i6=j
[(x · x)(a
′
j · a
′
i)]b
′′
i .
(5)
We can learn a little about this model through a consideration
of the two terms in (5). The first term represents the desired
vector b
′′
j , weighted by a scalar term that results from taking
the dot products of two vectors with themselves. The second
term is effectively an error term; if the similarity between
the cue a′j and the other cues that were used to store the
memory (a′i) is too great then this error term will become
large and the chances of the correct item being recalled will
decrease. In short, the other stored memories (b′′i , (i 6= j))
will interfere with the desired term. It is also worth noting
that the explicit representation of the context vectors using a
dot product (i.e. x · x) in (5) suggests that the authors were
open to the idea of a different context being present during the
recall process, even if this was not explicitly discussed [10].
We shall return to this point in section VII, however, a brief
foreshadowing of that argument runs as follows: We consider
the use of context in this model to be unsatisfactory. Firstly,
while the role of context is fundamental to this model, it
must be explicitly and fully recorded at the time of storage. A
slightly different context, or even a more detailed specification
of the same context could result in the retrieval of a very
different piece of information, even though a very similar cue
was utilized. The static treatment of context that is provided
by this model therefore leaves us with what i an interesting
retrieval paradigm, which is however perhaps unnecessarily
limited. We are left wondering if there is scope for a more
adaptive treatment of context, one provided by the geometric
models of conceptual space that were introduced in section IV.
In the remainder of this article we shall endeavor to connect
these two interesting approaches into an integrated cognitive
memory model which could be used to form the basis of
a future physical implementation of computational memory.
This approach takes its inspiration from a set of models that
consider information retrieval in context, utilizing the powerful
formalism of quantum theory [1]–[4], [38], [39].
VI. INCORPORATING CONTEXT INTO INFORMATION
ENCODING AND RETRIEVAL
The seminal book by van Rijsbergen [1] provides a novel
approach to the modeling of semantic spaces, inspired by
Quantum Theory (QT). This approach models a word w as
a vector
|w〉 =


w1
.
.
.
wn

 (6)
where |w〉 is termed a ket, in contrast to the row vector
obtained by taking the transpose: 〈w| = |w〉T = (w1, . . . , wn).
In this case, we shall take the subcomponents w1 . . . wn to be
the weights allocated to each of the available senses that the
word might take in a n-dimensional vector space.
We can quickly see the connection to both vector space
based approaches and the Matrix Model of Memory. In both
cases a vector was obtained, (although in each case this was via
a different process) and formed the basis of further analysis.
However, the formalism of quantum theory provides an extra
level of structure that implicitly incorporates a more adaptive
notion of context into information recall.
This is done by seriously considering what it means to
define a basis for a conceptual space. Thus, the vector of
(6) must be considered in its context; it is a representation
of information within a high dimensional vector space, with
the vector entries determining the extent of the vector in each
of the relevant dimensions.
This geometric model provides predictions about the likely
recall of an item from memory within a given context. This
is achieved via an application of Pythagoras’ theorem. Thus,
simplifying equation (6) down to a vector occurring in a two
dimensional space, we might find that it could be drawn as
shown in figure 1, where
|w〉 =a0
(
0
1
)
+ a1
(
1
0
)
(7)
=a0|0p〉+ a1|1p〉, and |a0|2 + |a1|2 = 1. (8)
Here, {|0p〉 ≡ (0, 1)T , |1p〉 ≡ (1, 0)T } define an orthonormal
|w >
 0= a  |0 > + a  |1 >
a
a0
|0 >
1 |1 >
c
c
cc   1 c
Fig. 1. A concept w, for example red, is represented in some contextual
probe c which takes the form of a choice of basis. This low dimensional
representation shows a case of some object being classified by a probe as
“red” (|1〉) or “not red” (|0〉), with the probability of that a “red” judgment
being given by |a1|2. In a higher number of dimensions the property of
redness will be enclosed by a convex region, and the probabilities lie in a
range of values specified by the extent of that region.
basis, and so the inner product of these basis vectors returns
0 or 1: 〈0p|0p〉 = 〈1p|1p〉 = 1 and 〈1p|0p〉 = 〈0p|1p〉 = 0.
The state (6), can be re-written using an extension of this
formalism, giving
|w〉 = w1


1
0
.
.
.
0

+ w2


0
1
.
.
.
0

+ · · ·+ wn


0
0
.
.
.
1

 (9)
which allows us to capture high dimensional vector represen-
tations of information. Here, the wj’s, or weights, represent
the extent to which a piece of information falls into each of
the dimensions of the vector space, and thus how much it
overlaps with the individual concepts represented by each axis
in the basis. This means that the convex region representing
a property in a conceptual space can be mapped out by a
collection of vectors covering that region, with each of the
weights mapping how much a given property is represented by
that dimension. A piece of stored information, (e.g. a concept
w) is thus represented in this framework as a state, or a vector
in a high dimensional space. For a low dimensional example,
consider the concept of “redness” that might be stored about
two different objects, such as an apple, and some wine. In
a two dimensional, or q-bit representation, each object will
be classified as either “red” or “not red” but this classification
will depend upon the context. Figure 1 depicts a possible state
which one of these objects might have, within a particular
concept space where |1〉 represents “red” and |0〉 “not red”.
Within this specific context, we might find that an apple is
more likely to be returned as a response to a query that asks
for a “red object” than is red wine, although this might change
were the information to be sought in a different context. We
shall return to this point shortly, showing how this formalism
can very naturally capture this behavior.
We propose that once information is stored in this complex
multidimensional space, it can be recovered through use of a
probe which enacts a quantum measurement of the state (7).
This is defined with respect to a projection operator V , where,
for the two dimensional case outlined above
V = |0p〉〈0p|+ |1p〉〈1p| = V0 + V1. (10)
According to the quantum formalism, the probability of a
probe represented by the p basis returning the desired value
is given by
P (|1〉) =〈w|V1|w〉 (11)
=〈w|1p〉〈1p|w〉 (12)
=
(
a∗
0
〈0p|1p〉+ a
∗
1
〈1p|1p〉
)
×(
a0〈0p|1p〉+ a1〈1p|1p〉
) (13)
=|a1|
2. (14)
However, in the context represented by the shifted basis in
figure 2 the probe returns the desired information with a
probability given by P (|1〉) = |b1|2. Thus, a search for a
|1q >
|0p >
|1p >
q >|0
a0
b0
b1
a1
Fig. 2. Changing the context of a probe can significantly affect the chances
of recall. Once this effect is incorporated into a Matrix-like memory model,
a structural information storage system becomes more viable.
“red object” in the context represented by p may yield a very
different result to that which searches in the context q.
The assumption in (7) that the squared coefficients of the
basis vectors sum to 1 allows for the treatment of these values
as probabilities since 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 etc. This approach makes
use of a geometrical notion of probability [40], which contrasts
with standard probability theory, where probabilistic outcomes
arise from our lack of knowledge as to what has actually oc-
curred. Quantum probabilities are profoundly different, arising
from a genuine state of uncertainty; the context in which the
information is to be represented must be defined before the
recall can start to make sense.
We shall now show how this more sophisticated treatment of
context can be utilized in an extension of the Matrix Memory
Model which, while retaining the representation of items and
cues as vectors, embeds them within a context that is spatial
rather than vectorial.
VII. REMEMBERING AS A PROCESS OF INFORMATION
RETRIEVAL
In line with the proposal by Wiles et. al [41], we take the
position that the recall of information from a memory structure
can be well represented by a contextual probe to an underlying
network structure. The construction of such a probe has been
a difficult problem for neural modelers, as it is difficult to
correlate the activation of neural connections with a logical, or
even conceptual, structure. However, with the three tier model
advocated by Ga¨rdenfors we can begin to see how a probe that
has both a logical (symbolic) structure, and a connection to the
lower (subsymbolic) level neural model can be created. This
section will sketch out the key details of this construction.
We start with a reference to the result shown in van
Rijsbergen that projection operators such as the one in (10)
can be used to define a conditional logic [1], meaning that the
link between the quantum conceptual space that we discussed
in section VI and higher order logic has already been found.
This leaves the connection between the subsymbolic neural
level and the conceptual levels to be made. Returning to the
consideration of the Matrix Model that was started in section V
we recall its use of a somewhat unsatisfactory explicit context.
The representation of context in this model as a vector (i.e. x)
means that it acquires an ontological status equivalent to that
of the items that are used as cues, or stored to be retrieved
by those cues, however, we believe that this identification is
incorrect. Rather then behaving as a thing, or absolute entity,
context appears to be more of a relationship between the
thing currently under consideration (i.e. the memory for this
scenario) and a perspective from which it will be viewed. This
is a very new approach to the treatment of context in compu-
tational representations, which most commonly take context to
be a thing, or a parameter [42], [43] with a similar ontological
status as very system which is being considered within that
context. This is unlikely to be a satisfactory approach, but the
lack of alternative formal models has hindered the adoption
of a more sophisticated understanding. However, the quantum
inspired model presented above makes use of a very different
conceptualization, that we shall refer to here as an implicit
context, which frames the system under consideration rather
than being of a similar form to it. In what follows, we shall
make use of this implicit notion of context in an extension to
the Matrix Model of Memory which treats context as a space
rather than a vector.
This will be achieved by utilizing projection operators rather
than vectors to represent the context in which storage and
recall takes place. Thus, in place of the context vector x in
(5), we propose to utilize a projection operator that arises in
the same space as the memory itself
Vx =
n∑
h=1
|xh〉〈xh|. (15)
This equation takes the vector notion of context utilized in
equation (5) and translates it into a set of projection operators
defined using basis vectors, each of which could have been a
context vector in the Matrix Model. Returning to equation (5)
we rewrite it with this extended understanding of the context
of a memory:
VyajE = Vyaj
k∑
i=1
Vxaibi (16)
where Vy is a second cueing context defined with respect to
the vector y which could be specified with a different set of
basis vectors to x. Expanding the projection operators in this
equation starts to give us some indication of how this model
can be expected to behave:
VyajE =
n∑
h=1
k∑
i=1
|yh〉〈yh|aj〉|xi〉〈xi|ai〉|bi〉 (17)
=
n∑
h=1
k∑
i=1
uhjvi|yh〉|xi〉|bi〉 (18)
=
∑
h,i
uhjviyhxibi, (19)
where uhj = 〈yh|aj〉 and vi = 〈xi|ai〉 are scalars, obtained
by taking the associated dot products of the corresponding
vectors. These scalars weight the contribution of the individual
cue, context and stored item vectors. If the context of recall
is the same as the context of recording (i.e. y = x) then we
can say a little more about the recall process using a standard
property of projection operators: VxVx = Vx [40].
VxajE = Vxaj
k∑
i=1
Vxaibi (20)
= Vxaj
k∑
i=1
aibi (21)
=
k∑
i=1
vixiaibi. (22)
Finally, breaking (22) into the two components utilized in (5)
we find that
VyajE = vjxjajbj +
∑
i6=j
vixiaibi (23)
which has the same item to be retrieved + error terms of (5)
but in more complex space that contains all cue, contexts
and items stored in the memory. We finish by noting that
this equation suggests that a context which maximizes vj
will increase the probability of a correct retrieval result, but
many different contexts could have been used. Indeed, we need
merely shift the basis in equation (15) in order to obtain a very
different set of representations for the items in memory, and
these would have a very different set of probabilities for recall.
Thus, with a shift to a geometric space we see a way in which
information might be stored and retrieved from a system based
upon traditional storage mechanisms than is currently the case,
all through the use of a sophisticated notion of context.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A strength of this approach lies in the density of information
that it is likely to be able to store. The choice of a structural
approach to information storage, with a potentially infinite set
of contexts, allows for memory to move from a density driven
approach, where the quantity of information stored is inversely
proportional to the size of the components used to store it,
towards one where storage capacity is limited only by how
many sensible contexts can be used to retrieve the required
information. Even with a very small storage space, a wide
range of representations can still be obtained from a conceptual
space that takes the underlying subsymbolic structure and
complexifies it according to the context in which it is accessed.
Such an “actualization of potential” [30] provides both creative
ability and extra storage capability. Indeed, with this approach,
we can start to see how the lowest, or neural level of cognition
can be made redundant despite its strong dependence upon a
specific structure.
While we have emphasized the background of this quantum
inspired model in the field of Information Retrieval, a related
line of work [5]–[8], [45], [46] makes use of a quantum
approach to model concepts and their combinations. Thus,
a growing body of literature points to the utility of the
quantum formalism in modeling Information in context from
both the cognitive and the computational sides of Information
storage and retrieval. This approach has also been utilized
in a preliminary approach illustrating how context might be
incorporated into vector spaces described with reference to a
point of view [47]. A solution which that paper shows might
circumvent the apparent incompatibility between metricity and
the similarity judgments that humans actually make [48].
While the proposed approach is in its very early days, we
feel that its incorporation of a wide range of both cognitive and
computational insights makes it a highly interesting avenue
to pursue as we search for new paradigms of computational
memory and information storage. Future work will investigate
the manner in which different contexts might interfere with
specified cues to produce different probabilities of recall and
hence different items from memory. It will also seek to further
clarify the role of the projection operators in specifying a
context space, and to extend the formalism proposed at the
end of the previous section. Finally, we intend to take seriously
the notion of creativity as it arises in human memory, and to
investigate the manner in which a similar notion might arise
in a system such as this. Such a result would bring us one step
closer towards a system capable of exhibiting a true form of
computational intelligence.
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